Nāgārjuna (c. 150–250 CE)

A comparative analysis with the CoD

I. Abstract

Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka is one of the most radical and influential deconstructive philosophies in human history. His system dismantles all substantialist views of reality by arguing that nothing exists on its own, independent of everything else, and that all phenomena arise only through dependent co-arising (pratītyasamutpāda).^[1] The Conference of Difference (CoD) proposes a fundamentally different ontology: not a deconstruction of substance, but a constructive account of being as the constitutive relational process of 'declaring together' (conference) of difference. As mentioned in Methodology, this comparative assessment employs the Ontological Model Assessment Framework (OMAF). The OMAF reveals a foundational convergence on the criterion of primacy-of-existence—both reject substance in favor of relation—but a critical divergence on the criterion of manner-of-existence, contrasting Nāgārjuna's structural assertion of dependent co-arising with the CoD's processual account of conferential binding. This comparison contributes to the overall thesis by demonstrating how the CoD resolves key tensions in Nāgārjuna's model—particularly the relationship between conventional and ultimate truth, and the risk of nihilistic interpretation—by supplying the processual account of relational arising that Nāgārjuna's structural assertion (pratītyasamutpāda) leaves open.

II. Overview of Nāgārjuna

Nāgārjuna (c. 150–250 CE) stands as the foundational philosopher of the Madhyamaka school of Mahāyāna Buddhism and one of the most rigorous dialectical thinkers in world philosophy. His monumental work, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way), systematically deconstructs all metaphysical positions—including the Buddhist Abhidharma's own reification of dharmas—to establish the Middle Way between eternalism and nihilism. His central claim is that nothing possesses svabhāva: nothing exists on its own, independent of everything else. All phenomena arise only through pratītyasamutpāda (dependent co-arising). What Nāgārjuna calls 'emptiness' (śūnyatā) is not nothingness; it is the claim that things are relational through and through.

In Nāgārjuna: a CRUP-OMAF case study, its ontology is assessed as follows:

Nāgārjuna's model asserts a primacy-of-existence grounded in dependent co-arising (pratītyasamutpāda). The rejection of svabhāva provides a coherent negative grounding: nothing exists independently, and all existence is relational through and through. His radical dialectic (prasaṅga) demonstrates that any positive metaphysical thesis—existence, non-existence, both, neither—leads to contradiction when examined for standalone existence. What survives the dialectic is the structural claim that all things arise in dependence on other things.

The manner-of-existence for any entity is relational and processual, but characterized by a fundamental lack: things exist only as dependently designated, without any core nature of their own. The two-truths doctrine (saṃvṛtisatya and paramārthasatya) distinguishes conventional truth—the world of everyday experience and causal regularity—from ultimate truth—the absence of standalone existence in all phenomena. Critically, these two truths are non-dual: conventional reality is not abandoned but is understood as empty, and emptiness is not a separate reality but is the nature of conventional phenomena.

The relationship-between-multiplicity-and-unity is deconstructive. Neither unity nor multiplicity is ultimately real; both are conventional designations. The Middle Way avoids all extreme positions, including the reification of either the one or the many.

III. Overview of the CoD

The Conference of Difference (CoD) model claims that, as a 'condition of being', existence is, by extension, a 'process of declaring together of action to be'. This condition: 'process of declaring together' can itself be described as a conference of difference: a 'condition of bearing together' transforming the 'condition of bearing apart'. Logically, every conference is of difference as every difference is born of conference. Critically, this is not a causal circle but a constitutive one: neither term precedes the other; each is intelligible only through the other.^[2] Therefore, the conference of difference is irreducible in and of itself and thus the process primitive of existence.

In the Conference of Difference: a CRUP-OMAF case study, its ontology is assessed as follows:

• On primacy-of-existence: The CoD reveals primacy, not in substance of entities but, in the relational process itself: the conference of difference—relation precedes relata. Entities are discerned as stabilized patterns within this ongoing process. As declared in Koan 10.1, 'all existence is a conference of difference'. Relation is not something that happens between discerned entities but rather the process primitive that transforms existence itself.
• On manner-of-existence: The manner-of-existence is fundamentally conferential and transformative. Thus, being: 'action to be' is a continuous, dynamic process of 'bearing together' and 'bearing apart' – a constant negotiation that defines the 'condition of being' that is existence. 'All existence transforms via binding, not freedom' (Koan 30.7).
• On the relationship-between-multiplicity-and-unity: Unity is an immanent and continuous achievement of the conference of difference itself. Koan 80.1 frames this as a universal reciprocity that moves toward equilibrium—a self-organizing principle inherent to existence itself.

IV. Comparison

Criterion 1: Primacy-of-Existence

• Statement: The OMAF assessment identifies a foundational convergence on what constitutes the fundamental ground of reality: both models reject substance and prioritize relation.

• Nāgārjuna's position: Nāgārjuna locates primacy in dependent co-arising (pratītyasamutpāda). His central claim is that nothing possesses svabhāva—nothing exists on its own, independent of everything else. All things arise only in dependence on other things. The ground of reality is not a substance or entity but the relational structure of dependent origination itself. What Nāgārjuna calls 'emptiness' (śūnyatā) is not nothingness; it is the claim that things do not exist on their own—that they are relational through and through.^[3]

• CoD's position: The CoD locates primacy in the constitutive relational process—the conference of difference itself. There is no pre-existing architecture; architecture emerges from the ongoing conference of difference. Relation precedes relata.

• Interpretive analysis: This is a remarkable convergence between two radically different traditions. Nāgārjuna's ontologist is a dialectical deconstructor, demonstrating that any attempt to grasp a thing as existing on its own leads to contradiction. The CoD's ontologist is a constructive synthesizer, articulating how the conference of difference generates and sustains all patterns of existence.

  Yet the underlying insight is strikingly similar: both reject the primacy of substance in favor of relation. But they establish the priority of relation in different ways. Nāgārjuna establishes a structural fact: things arise only in dependence on other things. Pratītyasamutpāda names this structure. What Nāgārjuna does not provide is a processual account of how that dependence operates—what the dynamics of dependent arising are, or how relation generates and sustains phenomena. He asserts that nothing stands alone; he does not describe what relational arising is doing.

  The CoD, by contrast, does not merely assert that relation is primary. It gives a processual account of relationality: the conference of difference, the 'declaring together' of action to be, the bearing together that transforms bearing apart. Where Nāgārjuna names the structure, the CoD names the process. This is the deeper difference between the two models—not negative versus positive in tone, but structural assertion versus processual account.

  This raises a question about what kind of claim Nāgārjuna is making. He explicitly declares pratītyasamutpāda as the central teaching and equates it with emptiness and the middle way. If the structural fact—that nothing exists on its own—is a positive claim about existence, then Madhyamaka is an anti-substance ontology, but one that leaves the process unspecified. If it is not a positive claim, then the system rests on an assertion whose status Nāgārjuna himself leaves unsettled—he declares that he has no thesis, while also declaring pratītyasamutpāda as the central teaching. Either way, the CoD's constructive move—to give a processual account of relational arising, not merely to assert that relation is primary—addresses something Madhyamaka leaves open.^[4]

Criterion 2: Manner-of-Existence

• Statement: The models diverge sharply on the fundamental character of how things exist.

• Nāgārjuna's Position: The manner-of-existence is characterized by lack: things exist only as dependently designated, without any core nature. To exist is to be empty of standalone existence, to be a conventional designation within the interplay of dependent co-arising. Existence is not a state or an action in the positive sense; it is a dependently arisen appearance, like a mirage or a dream—real within convention, but ultimately without standalone existence.^[5]

• CoD's Position: The CoD posits a manner-of-existence defined by dynamic, transformative binding. To be is to be in a state of 'bearing together' and 'bearing apart'—an active, participatory condition. Existence is not a state but an ongoing action, a continuous negotiation that defines the 'condition of being' that existence literally is.

• Interpretive Analysis: This is the uncharacterized structure versus characterized process distinction. Nāgārjuna's being is fundamentally apophatic: any positive characterization of what things are is ultimately deconstructed to reveal their lack of standalone existence. What is not deconstructed is the structural claim that things arise in dependence on other things. His famous tetralemma (catuṣkoṭi) systematically negates all four possibilities: that a thing exists, does not exist, both exists and does not exist, neither exists nor does not exist. The result is not a positive ontology but a therapeutic liberation from all ontological clinging.

  The CoD's being is kataphatic: existence is a positive, generative process of conferential binding. The CoD does not deny that things lack standalone existence—indeed, it agrees with Nāgārjuna that relation precedes relata—but it characterizes this relational process positively as 'declaring together of action to be'. Where Nāgārjuna says 'not this, not this' (neti neti), the CoD says 'this conferring, this binding'.

  Nāgārjuna would likely respond that the CoD's positive characterization of the conference of difference risks reifying the process itself. The CoD would respond that it explicitly avoids this by applying its own principle reflexively—the conference of difference is not a substance but the process primitive, and it too is empty of standalone existence. The primary difference is what each model does with the processual question: Nāgārjuna leaves it open; the CoD answers it. The secondary difference is therapeutic orientation: Nāgārjuna's method aims at liberation from clinging; the CoD's aims at constructive understanding of existence's generative dynamics.

Criterion 3: Relationship-between-multiplicity-and-unity

• Statement: The most significant divergence in this comparison concerns how each model reconciles the one and the many.

• Nāgārjuna's position: Unity and multiplicity are both ultimately without standalone existence. Neither the one nor the many exists on its own. Within conventional truth, we can speak of unity and multiplicity as pragmatically valid designations, but ultimately, all such designations are without standalone existence. The Middle Way avoids reifying either unity or multiplicity, neither asserting their ultimate reality nor denying their conventional validity.^[6]

• CoD's position: The CoD synthesizes unity and multiplicity without subordinating one to the other. Unity is not a given structure but an ongoing achievement—the 'bearing together' that emerges from and is constituted by multiplicity (the 'bearing apart'). The conference is their relational nexus. Unity is immanent, continuous, and fragile; it must be constantly achieved through the ongoing conference of difference.

• Interpretive analysis: Nāgārjuna's unity is a convention—valid within its domain but without standalone existence. The CoD's unity is a symphony—dynamic but coherent, composed of the interplay of differences. Both reject the reification of unity as a pre-existing structure, but they differ in their positive accounts: Nāgārjuna offers no positive account of unity beyond its conventional validity; the CoD offers a constructive account of unity as an ongoing achievement of conferential binding.

  The CoD's model accounts for the reality of both unity and multiplicity without subordinating one to the other. Unity is not prior to multiplicity (as in substantialist models) but is constitutive of it. The universe is a unified whole not because it is composed of layers or substances, but because it is a single, boundless Conference of Difference. Nāgārjuna would caution against reifying this 'single, boundless Conference' as a new form of svabhāva, but the CoD explicitly applies its own principle reflexively: the conference of difference is not a substance but the process primitive, empty of standalone existence.

V. Implications

The central philosophical lesson from confronting the CoD with Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka is that ontology need not choose between a purely negative deconstruction that risks nihilistic interpretation and a purely positive construction that risks reification. The CoD provides an immanent ground in relational process itself, solving a specific problem that vexes Nāgārjuna's model: how to articulate the generative, transformative character of reality without abandoning the critique of substance.

Nāgārjuna's world is a dream—conventionally real but ultimately without standalone existence, a dependently arisen appearance without any core nature. The CoD's world is a symphony—dynamic, participatory, and continuously achieved, where the interplay of differences in conference is the very condition of its unified existence, with no categorical structure separate from the relational process itself.

This comparison strengthens the case for the CoD by showing its capacity to:

• Resolve the tension between conventional and ultimate truth: Where Nāgārjuna's two-truths doctrine is often read as creating a tension between the conventional world of everyday experience and the ultimate truth of emptiness, the CoD offers a continuous, relational process where conventional patterns are stabilized achievements of the conference of difference, not ultimately separate from it. The CoD does not need a two-truths doctrine because it does not posit a separate ultimate reality; the conference of difference is the reality of both conventional and ultimate alike.
• Account for both emptiness and generativity: Where Nāgārjuna's via negativa risks nihilistic interpretation (a risk he explicitly addresses but which remains a perennial challenge for interpreters), the CoD offers a positive, generative account that maintains the critique of substance while articulating the dynamics of existence. The CoD agrees with Nāgārjuna that nothing exists on its own, but it adds a constructive account of how things do exist—as stabilized patterns of conferential binding.
• Embrace dynamism without losing coherence: Where Nāgārjuna's deconstruction risks dissolving all coherence into emptiness, the CoD offers a dynamic, processual account that still maintains unity through its constitutive relationality. The CoD's universe is coherent not despite its dynamism but because of it—the conference of difference is the very source of both unity and multiplicity.

In short: Nāgārjuna names the structure of reality—things arise only in dependence on other things—and leaves the process unspecified. The CoD names the process that underwrites that structure: the conference of difference, the declaring together of action to be, the bearing together that transforms bearing apart. Where Nāgārjuna sees a dependently arisen appearance without standalone existence—a conventional reality to be seen through via negation—the CoD sees a pure relational process where structure and pattern are emergent achievements rather than pre-given realities. Where Nāgārjuna deconstructs all views to liberate from clinging, the CoD constructs a positive account of conferential binding to understand existence's generative dynamics. Both reject substance; but where Nāgārjuna's rejection leads to silence on the process, the CoD's leads to an exposition of it.

VI. References

• Nāgārjuna. Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way).
• Nāgārjuna. Vigrahavyāvartanī (Verses on the Refutation of Objections).
• Garfield, Jay L. The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. Oxford University Press, 1995.
• Westerhoff, Jan. Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka: A Philosophical Introduction. Oxford University Press, 2009.
• Siderits, Mark. Buddhism as Philosophy: An Introduction. Ashgate, 2007.
• Mackay, John I. Conference of Difference: A CRUP-OMAF Case Study. 2025.
• Mackay, John I. Gospel of Being. (Provided text).
• Buddhist epistemological tradition (Dignāga, Dharmakīrti) for operational development.

The conference of
difference

It's not a theory of everything;
it is everything.

Read it FREE!

A systematic ontology of existence